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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
In the Matter of the Estate of
ANGELENA A. W.ALKER, Deceased, Walker Bank &· Trust
Company, a corporation, executor
of the last will of said deceased,

1
Case No. 6299

Appellant,
vs.

THE STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Respondent.

J

Appellant's Brief
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 11, 1935, Angelena A. Walker as trustor,
entered into an irrevocable trust agreement with Walker
Bank & Trust Company as trustee (Abs. 5, Trans. 5) wherein and whereby the trustor transferred to the trustee certain shares of capital stock, to be held in trust, the income
therefrom to be paid to the trustor during her life, and
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upon her death to her children, with the corpus to the
grandchildren, as in such instrument provided.
Angelena A. Walker died testate on the ~th day of
June, 1939, and thereafter Walker Bank & Trust Company,
named in the will of said deceased as such, was appointed
and qualified as executor of her estate. Thereafter, and on
the 23rd day of December, 1939, said executor filed in the
court below an Inheritance Tax Report and Appraisement,
listing property in the estate of said deceased (Abs. 2,
Trans. 1) but did not include therein the property transferred by such trust agreement, although at that time it
advised the Tax Commission of Utah of such trust agreement, and supplied it with a copy thereof, contending that
the subject matter of said trust is not subject to inheritance
tax to the State of Utah (Abs. 4, Trans. 2). Thereafter,
and on April 18, 1940, the State Tax Commission of Utah
filed in the probate proceedings in the court below its petition for an order adjudging the transfer of property under
such trust indenture to be a taxable transfer under the
inheritance tax laws of the State of Utah, and that such
executor be required to file a supplemental inventory covering such trust property and have such trust property appraised for inheritance tax purposes (Abs. 5, Trans. 5).
The executor demurred to this petition (Abs. 11, Trans.
9), which demurrer was overruled on July 9, 1940 (Abs. 12,
Trans. 12). The executor elected to stand upon its demurrer
(Abs. 12, Trans. 15) and thereupon the c-ourt below made
and entered its judgment dated July 17, 1940, to the effect
that such transfer under said trust indenture is a taxable
transfer under the provisions of the inheritance tax laws
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of the State of Utah, and ordering· said executor to file a
supplemental inventory of the property so transferred by
said trust indenture, for appraisement for state inheritance
tax purposes.
This appeal is taken from such order.
ERRORS RELIED UPON

Appellant has assigned as error the overruling by
the court below of its demurrer and the making and rendering of its said judgment dated July 17, 1940, and relies
upon such errors for reversal of said judgment of the
court below.
STATEMENT OF QUESTION INVOLVED FOR
DETERMINATION

The only question involved in this appeal is one of law
as to whether the property transferred by the deceased,
Angelena A. Walker, by such irrevocable trust indenture,
is subject to inheritance tax to the State of Utah as a
transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after the death of the trustor.
ARGUMENT
Section 80-12-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as
amended by Chapter 88, Laws of Utah, 1935·, provides for
a tax equal to certain specified percentages of the market
value of the net estate upon the "transfer of the net estate
of every decedent."
Section 80-12-3, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, is as
follows:
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"The value of the gross estate of a decedent
shall be determined by including the value at the
time of his death of all property, real or personal,
within the jurisdiction of this state, and any interest
therein, whether tangible or intangible, which shall
pass to any person, in trust or otherwise, by testamentary disposition ·or by law of inheritance or
succession of this or any other state or country, or
by deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift made in contemplation of the death of the grantor, vendor or
donor, ·or intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after his death."
Respondent contends that the transfer under the
trust here involved was one "intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after " the death of Mrs.
Walker, and is therefore subject to inheritance tax to the
State of Utah. Appellant eontends that it was not a transfer
to take effect either in possession or enjoyment at or after
her death.
Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 237,
74 L. ed. 826 (1930), the highest courts of the states where
the question had arisen had decided that transfers by irrevocable trust, where the donor had reserved the income
therefrom during his life, were transfers made to take
effect in p~ssession or enjoyment at or after the death of the
donor, and subject to tax under the inheritance tax laws
of such states, without in any case going into the distinction
betw·een inher.itance tax laws and estate-tax laws.
On April 14, 1930, the Supreme Court of the United
Stat~s handed down its.decisioni~ the case of May v. Heiner,
which involved the construction of the language with· respect
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to a transfer by irrevocable trust, the donor retaining income during life, under the provisions of the F'ederal estate
tax law, as then in effect, making subject to such tax transfers "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after" death. It appears from the decision that Pauline
May in 1917 transferred certain personal property in trust,
to collect the income therefrom and after discharging
taxes, expenses, etc., to pay the balance "to Barney May
during his lifetime, and after his decease, to Pauline May
during her lifetime, and after her decease, all the property
in said trust, in whatever form or shape it may be, shall,
after the expenses of the trust have been deducted or paid,
be distributed equally among" her four children, their
distributees or appointees.
The court, in holding that the transfer was not taxable,
even though the donor retained income during her life after
the death of her husband, uses the following language:
"
. At the death of Mrs. May no interest
in the property held under the trust deed passed
from her to the living; title thereto had been definitely fixed by the trust deed. The interest therein
which she possessed immediately prior to her death
was obliterated by that event.
"Section 401 Revenue Act of 1918, lays a charge
'upon the transfer of the net estate of every decedent
dying after the passage of this act,' and Sec. 402
directs that 'the value of the gross estate of the
decedent shall be determined by including the value
at the time of his death of all property, real or
personal, tangible or intangible, whenever situated
(c) to the extent of any interest therein
of which the decedent has at any time made a trans-
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fer, or with respect to which he has at any tijne
created a trust, in contemplation of or intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
his death .
'
"The statute imposes 'an excise upon the transfer of an estate upon death of the owner.' .
"In Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. 278 U. S.
339, 347, 348, 73 L. ed. 410, 414, 415, 66 A. L. R. 397,
49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 12.3, the estate tax prescribed by
the Revenue Act of 1918, Sec. 402 (c) and carried
into the Act of 1921 (November 23) 42· Stat. at
L. 278, chap. 136, as Sec. 402 (c) thereof was under
consideration. This court said:
"'In its plan and scope the tax is one imposed on transfers at death or made in contemplation of death and is measured by the value
at death of the interest which is transferred
One may freely give his property to
another by absolute gift without subjecting himself or his estate to a tax, but we are asked to
say that this statute means that he may not
make a gift inter vivos, equally absolute and
complete, without subjecting it to a tax if the
gift takes the form of a life estate in one with
remainder over to another at or after the donor's
death. It would require plain and eompelling
language to justify so incongruous a result and
we think it is wanting. in the present statute
" 'In the light of the ·general· purpose of the
statute and the language of Sec. 401 explicitly
imposing the tax on net estates of decedents, we
think it at least doubtful whether the trusts or
interests in a trust intended to be reached by
the phrase in Sec. 402· (c) , 'to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death,' in. clude any others than those passing from the
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possession, enjoyment or control of the donor
at his death and so taxable as transfers at death
under Sec. 401. That doubt must be resolved
in favor of the taxpayer.'"
It may be contended by respondent that this case is
not controlling because of the slight difference in the terms
of the trust, and because it quotes as support for the decision,
the earlier decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Reineke v. Northern Trust Company,
278 U. S. 339, which it may be contended does not pass upon
the question involved here. Even though all that were true,
the Supreme Court of the United States, subsequently, left
no doubt as to its holding that gifts or transfers under
irrevocable trusts, where the income was reserved to the
donor, were not subject to Federal estate tax as "intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after" death,
all as clearly indicated by Per Curiam decisions on Writs
of Certiorari in the three United States Circuit Court of
Appeal cases to which we next invite the. attention of this
Court.
Commissioner v. Northern Trust Company, 41
Fed. ( 2d) 732
The transfer involved in this case was by irrevocable
trust -deed providing for payment of income to settlor for
life and thereafter to children. The court, in deciding that
the transfer was not taxable as intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after death, uses the following language :
"Did Mrs. ·Van Schaick, when she executed the
trust deed~ intend that· the ·transfer should !take

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

· effect in possession or enjoyment at or after her
death? Petitioner contends that this question should
be answered in the affirmative, relying on numerous decisions applying similar statutes to situations
like the one here presented. Reish, Adm'r, v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 521; In re Johnson's Estate
(Surr.) 19 N. Y. S. 963, 965; People v. Carpenter,
264 Ill. 400, 106 N. E. 302. Since the briefs were
written, in this case, the Supreme Court decided
the case of May v. Heiner, 50S. Ct. 286, 74 L. Ed. 826.
We are unable to distinguish the material facts in
that case from those in the instant case. It is true
that the settlor in the May Case provided in her trust
deed for the life use by her husband and, upon his
death, she surviving, for the life use of herself. This
difference in the facts, however, seems to us immaterial. The conclusion, under this decision, seems
inescapable that property conveyed by an irrevocable
deed of trust, to third parties, with no reversionary
interest, contingent or otherwise, in the settlor,
though the income during the settlor's life be payable
to settlor, does not pass at the settlor's death, but
at the date of the execution and delivery of the
deed of trust.
"
On Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the
Unit~d States, 283 U. S. 782, that Court by Per Curiam
decision, affirmed the decision of the lower court "upon
the authority of May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238, 74 L. ed. 826,
67 A. L. R. 1244, 50 S. Ct. 286."
Commissioner v. McCormick, 43 Fed. (2d) 277
In this case, the· Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
transfer under a trust agreement calling for payment of
estate to settlor if she survived beneficiaries was taxable
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as a "transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after death."
On Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the
United States, 283 U. S. 783, that Court by Per Curiam
decision, reversed the decision of the lower court "upon
the authority of May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238, 72 L. ed.
826, 67 A. L. R. 1244, 50 S. Ct. 286."
Commissioner v. Morsman, 44 Fed. (2d) 902
In this case the court held that the property transferred
by an irrevocable trust was subject to Federal estate tax
as a transfer to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after death, in the court's language, "where in creating
the trust, the donor reserves during life the enjoyment of
the income of the trust, that to cease or to pass to another
only on the donor's death."
On Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the
United States, 283 U. S. 783, that Court by Per Curiam
decision, reversed the decision of the lower court "upon
th.e authority of May v. Heiner, 2:81 U. S. 238, 72 L. ed. 826,
67 A. L. R. 1244, 50 S. Ct. 286."
We will later discuss the case of Rising's Estate v.
State (Minn.) 242 N. W. 459, but it is significant that in
that case, where it was held that a transfer under an
irrevocable trust where the donor retained .the income
for life was taxable under the inheritance tax statute of
Minnesota, after discussing May v. Heiner and the three
Federal cases above noted, with the action of the Supreme
Court thereon, the court states: "Of course, such decisions
end debate as to the construction of the act of Congress
which. they interpret.''
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Clearly the rule in the Federal courts is that a gift or
transfer under irrevocable trust where the donor retains
the income for life is not subject to the Federal estate
tax in effect prior to amendment, as intended to take effect
in possession or enjoyment at or after death.
The Federal estate tax was amended in 1932 to add
to the language "intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after his death" the language "or of which
he has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise,
under which he has retained for his life .
. the right
to the income from the property .
.",Section 811, Title
26, U. S. C. A.
The question for decision involved here is a matter
of first impression in this court. We do not contend that
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
are binding upon this court in a matter of construction of
our state inheritance tax laws, as no Federal constitutional
questions are involved, and it is merely a matter of statutory construction in which tpis court has the final say as
to these particular state statutes. We do contend, however,
that these Federal decisions, and especially those of the
Supreme Court of the United States, are highly persuasive,
and in view of the nature of our inheritance tax statutes
as defined by this court, and the decisions in the highest
courts of ·other states since the rendition of the decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States to which we have
called attention, differentiating between their statutes as
inheritance tax. laws and that of the Federal government
as estate tax laws, we think that the rule laid. do.wn by the
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Supreme Court of the United States is the one that reason
should compel this court to adopt.
In the state cases decided before the case of May v.
Heiner, holding that a transfer similar to the transfer here
involved, was a transfer to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death, no issue was raised as to the distinction between the effect of an inheritance tax and estate tax
upon the interpretation of this language.
The state cases since May v. Heiner have in most cases
differentiated between the interpretation of "possession
or enjoyment at or after death" under inheritance and under
estate tax laws, and in all such cases where the issue was
raised, the statute involved was an inheritance tax statute.
It must be borne in mind that in May v. Heiner the
last quoted .language was interpreted under an estate tax
statute and in this connection, it is very important to note
that ·our so-called "Inheritance" tax statute involves not an
inheritance tax, but an estate tax. This is unique and unusual with respect to state statutes as they are nearly all
inheritance tax statutes and determined to be such. This
court, however, has determined our "Inheritance" tax to be
an estate tax.
State Tax Commission v. Backman, 88 Utah
424, 55 Pac. (2d) 171
This court in this case, in holding the Utah statute to
be an estate tax, uses the following language:
"The tax in reality is not a levy on the abstract
right to either transmit or to receive, but is on the
exercise of one or the other right ·or on the transaction by which the property is transmitted and
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received. It is the death of the decedent, with the
resulting transfer of the estate by will or operation
of law, which gives rise to the tax."
"For purposes .of precise classification, the term
'inheritance tax' is used to indicate a tax imposed on
the right to receive, and the term 'estate tax' designates a tax imposed on the right to transmit. Our
statute uses the term 'inheritance tax,' but that fact
should not be conclusive in fixing its classification
because used in its general sense rather than with
scientific nicety. We must look to the enactment
itself rather than to its title in order to determine
the nature and incidence of the tax."
It will be noted that Section 80-12-2, Revised Statutes
of Utah 1933, as so amended, imposes a tax upon the
transfer just as in the Federal estate tax.
Under most of the state statutes, it is the receipt by
the heir, legatee or beneficiary that is taxed, whereas under
our statute and the Federal estate tax statute, it is the
transmission by the deceased which is taxed, hence the
holding in May v. Heiner that the transfer and delivery of
the property at the time ·of the trust deed is the controlling
act as distinguished from the receipt of the income by others
than the donor after his death. Now let us see what the
highest courts of other states have had to say about this
distinction since the decision in May v. Heiner.
Russell v. Cogswell (Kans.) 98 P. (2d) 179
This case was decided in March of this year, and is
the last case we are able to find involving the question here
discussed. In that case, it was held, in the language of the
syllabus, that "an irrevocable trust agreement by which
trustor fully parted with legal title to property, reserving
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to herself only income therefrom during her lifetime
constituted a 'deed, or g·rant or gift intended to take effect
in possession or enjoyment after the death of the grantor'
within the Kansas Inheritance Tax Law." The court, in its
opinion, however, finds no irreconcilable conflict between
its decision and that of the Federal courts. In this respect,
we quote from the opinion as follows :
"Let us consider whether there is in fact an
irreconcilable conflict between the federal and the
state decisions on this question. It must be remembered, at the outset, that the federal cases cited deal
with the federal 'estate tax' while the state cases
deal with 'inheritance taxes' similar to the Kansas
statute. Though some courts have loosely used the
two terms interchangeably, the fundamental difference between the two has been pointed out by the
textbook writers and many times in well-considered
judicial opinions. While the term 'inheritance tax'
has sometimes been used in a general sense to cover
all 'death taxes' a more restricted meaning is now
generally accepted. An 'estate tax' such as the
federal law imposes is a tax upon the right to transmit or transfer property at death. It is levied upon
the body Qf the estate before distribution. It does
not at all involve, primarily, the right of the distFibutee to receive the property. An 'inheritance ta?C' on
the other hand is not a tax upon the right to transmit or transfer, but is a succession tax, a tax upon
the right. of the distributee to receive the property
. The two rights are distinct and separate.
Neither is a. natural right, but is a right conferred
upon the individual by the state as an act of grace.
The power which so confers the right may levy a
tax upon its exercise." ·
·
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The court then goes on to discuss the May v. Heiner
decision to show the difference in the nature of the taxes,
and we particularly call the court's attention to this reasoning. The court then says :
"But does this reasoning apply equally to an
inheritance tax? We think not. If the gift was complete as far as the grantor was concerned when
the trust was created, it may well be argued that
an estate tax, being a tax upon the transfer from
the grantor, may not be imposed at his death since no
such transfer takes place at that time. But in the
case of an inheritance tax the completeness of such
previous transfer does not alter the fact that the
right to receive does not accrue to the beneficiary
until the death of the grantor."
Blodget v. Guaranty Trust Co. (Conn.) 158
Atl. 245
In this case it was held that transfers to a trustee under
an irrecovable trust to pay the income to transferors during
life and upon death to designated beneficiaries, were subject to state inheritance tax as "intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at transferor's death." The tax
here involved was an inheritance or succession tax. The
court, in its opinion, differentiated the tw·o. After discussing May v. Heiner and the Reineke case, the court says :
"
It is obvious from the quotation from
the opinion in the Reineke Case, which we have
given above, that the decision, upon which the succeeding cases -relied, was motivated by the nature
of the federal estate tax, which is upon the transfer
of, rather than the succession to, property of the
decedent.
On the other hand, with a few
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exceptions, the state inheritance tax statutes levy
a duty or excise upon the beneficiary for the privilege or right of succession to property
The
federal cases above mentioned, which are relied upon
in support of the claim that the transfers here in
question are not taxable, since they 'deal with the
construction of federal statutes imposing estate taxes
and . . . are distinguishable because of the terms
of those statutes, if not on other grounds.'
We have been able to discover no relevant subsequent case which has given these decisions an effect
adverse to the taxability of such gifts under state
succession tax statutes." (Italics ours).
We again call the attention of the court to the fact
that our state "Inheritance" tax statute is one of the few
which is not a tax upon the succession to property.
In re Rising's Estate v. State (Minn.) 242
N. W. 459
In this case a gift such as is involved in the case at bar
was held subject to state inheritance tax of Minnesota, the
language of which, however, was much broader than our
statute with respect to possession or enjoyment at or after
death, and covered "any property or the income thereof"
when the donee becomes "beneficially entitled, in possession or expectancy." After referring to the Federal cases
herein cited by us, the court uses this language :
Of course, such decisions end debate
"
as to the construction of the act of Congress which
they interpret. But, however persuasive, they are
not binding upon us in the construction of our own
statute, as to which it is our privilege to err, if that
be the result of our deliberate judgment. That aside,
our state tax is so far different, in incidence, from
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the federal excise that the cases are easily distinguishable. 'In its plan and scope' the latter is 'on
transfers at death or made in contemplation of death.'
'It is not a gift tax.' Our law, on the contrary, does
tax gifts. The federal 'exaction is not a succession
tax.
The right to become beneficially en..
titled is not the occasion for it.' Nichols v. Coolidge,
274 U. S. 531, 541, 47 S. Ct. 710, 713, 71 L. Ed. 1184,
52 A. L. R. 1081. Our law imposes, not alone a
transfer tax, but a succession tax also. State v.
Brooks, 181 Minn. 262, 232 N. W. 331. 'The thing
burdened is the right to receive.' Leach v. Nichols,
52 S. Ct. 338, 340, 76 L. Ed.- (opinion filed March
14, 1932). With reference to the federal tax, a transfer and not a succession tax was the language used in
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. and repeated in
May v. Heiner, to the effect that one may freely give
away his property without subjecting his estate to a
tax, and that otherwise the result would be 'incongruous.'
"Incongruous or not, our state tax is expressly
put on successions of the kind now involved.
"
In re Kutche's Estate (Mich.) 256 N. W. 586
The decision in this case, in the language of the syllabus, was that "irrevocable trust with direction to trustee
to pay entire income to trustor for life and upon her death
to deliver principal to certain beneficiaries, some of whose
shares, were trusted, held subject to inheritance tax as a
'gift intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after death' of trustor." The court distinguishes the
tax under the state law of l\iichigan from the Federal tax
on the basis of inheritance and estate taxes as discussed in
the case of In re Rising's Estate, supra, and in this respect
adopts the language of said case.
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We find no case where the issue has been raised that
hold a transfer such as is involved here is subject to tax
under an Esta.te tax statute, as distinguished from an Inheritance or Succession tax statute.
We therefore respectfully submit that in view of the
persuasive nature of the Federal decisions, the decision of
this Court that our "Inheritance" tax is really an estate
tax as distinguished from other states where their inheritance tax statutes are in reality inheritance or succession
tax statutes, and the differentiation of these two classes
of statues as set forth in the recent state cases, it should
be held that the property transferred by the irrevocable
trust here involved is not subject to tax under the "Inheritance" tax laws of the State of Utah, and that the judgment
of the lower court herein complained of be reversed and
set aside.
Respectfully submitted,
INGE'BRETSEN, RAY, RAWLINS
& CHRISTENSEN,

Attorneys for Appellant.
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